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Abstract 
The long history of persuasion research shows how to change explicit, self-reported evaluations 
through direct appeals. At the same time, research on how to change implicit evaluations has 
focused almost entirely on techniques of retraining existing evaluations or manipulating contexts. 
In five studies, we examined whether direct appeals can change implicit evaluations in the same 
way as they do explicit evaluations. In five studies, both explicit and implicit evaluations showed 
greater evidence of persuasion following information presented by a highly credible source than 
a source low in credibility. Whereas cognitive load did not alter the effect of source credibility 
on explicit evaluations, source credibility had an effect on the persuasion of implicit evaluations 
only when participants were encouraged and able to consider information about the source. Our 
findings reveal the relevance of persuasion research for changing implicit evaluations and 
provide new ideas about the processes underlying both types of evaluation.  
 
 
Word count of abstract = 150 
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Consider the Source: Persuasion of Implicit Evaluations is Moderated by Source Credibility 
 
“Consider the source” is advice the first author’s father often gave him when he was 
bothered by something hurtful one of his grade school classmates had said or done. Though this 
can be a difficult task for a child, research in persuasion has shown that most people do, in fact, 
consider the source when processing persuasive messages (e.g., Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953; 
see Briñol & Petty, 2009, for a recent review). One aspect of the source that people pay 
particular attention to is a source’s credibility; in most cases, an identical message is more 
effective at changing self-reported evaluations to the extent that the source is high in credibility, 
whether that credibility is gained through perceived expertise (Gottlieb & Sarel, 1991; Hovland 
& Weiss, 1951; Maddux & Rogers, 1980; McGinnies & Ward, 1980) or trustworthiness (Briñol, 
Petty, & Tormala, 2004; McGinnies & Ward, 1980; Tormala, Briñol, & Petty, 2007; Ziegler, 
2010). However, it should be noted that source effects do not always lead to persuasion in the 
intended direction; indeed, a highly-credible source can lead to reduced persuasion compared to 
a less credible source when the source’s argument is relatively weak (Bohner, Ruder, & Erb, 
2002; Tormala, Brinol, & Petty, 2006). 
While the persuasion literature has grown increasingly sophisticated, the accumulated 
research has primarily focused on changing explicit evaluations and thus it is currently unclear 
whether sources high in credibility might also be more impactful on automatic forms of 
evaluations – evaluations that we will refer to as implicit evaluations (De Houwer, 2009; 
Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006). Implicit evaluations differ from explicit ones in that they 
arise in an unintentional, uncontrolled, unconscious, efficient or fast manner. Because many 
aspects of human behavior share one or more of these features, it should come as no surprise that 
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research on implicit evaluations has led to significant advances in a wide variety of research 
areas including addiction (e.g., Wiers & Stacy, 2006), clinical psychology (see Teachman, Cody, 
& Clerkin, 2010), close relationships (e.g., Dewitte, De Houwer, & Buysse, 2008), consumer 
behavior (see Perkins & Forehand, 2010), forensics (see Snowden & Gray, 2010), 
psychopathology (e.g., Roefs et al., 2011), politics (see Nosek, Graham, & Hawkins, 2010), and 
social interactions (e.g., Fazio & Olson, 2003). Implicit evaluations are related, but distinct from 
explicit evaluations (Nosek & Smyth, 2007), and both predict variation in behavior that is not 
accounted for by the other (Greenwald, Uhlmann, Poehlman, & Banaji, 2009).  
Interestingly, implicit evaluations have been almost exclusively changed either by 
overtraining in the opposite direction of existing associations (e.g., Baccus, Baldwin, & Packer, 
2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Hermans, Baeyens, & Eelen, 2003; Kawakami, Phills, Steels, & 
Dovidio, 2007; Weirs, Eberl, Rinck, Becker, & Lindenmeyer, 2011) or by changing the context 
of evaluation to shift the associations that are activated (e.g., Blair, Ma, & Lenton, 2001; 
Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Mitchell, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003; Wittenbrink, Park, & Judd, 
2001). Explicit evaluations, on the other hand, have been shown to be amenable to a variety of 
manipulations (see Bohner & Dickel, 2011; Crano & Prislin, 2006 for recent reviews).  Of 
particular interest to the current work, many of these manipulations include the conscious 
consideration of persuasive information.  
There is some evidence that implicit evaluations can also be formed or changed on the 
basis of persuasive messages similar to those used to change explicit evaluations. In particular, 
implicit evaluations have been successfully formed by presenting participants with positive or 
negative information about novel stimuli (e.g., De Houwer, 2006; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006; 
Ratliff & Nosek, 2010; Rydell, McConnell, Mackie, & Strain, 2006; Whitfield & Jordan, 2009) 
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and existing implicit evaluations of vegetables have been changed by having participants read a 
written argument about the positive aspects of consuming vegetables (Horcajo, Briñol, & Petty, 
2010). In addition to manipulating the valence (i.e., one stimulus is “good” while another 
stimulus is “bad” or “neutral”), the type of persuasive message may matter, as suggested by the 
observation that implicit smoking evaluations of current smokers are more negative following an 
affectively laden anti-smoking argument than following a cognitive anti-smoking argument 
(Smith & De Houwer, under review). Finally, a study by Forehand and Perkins (2005) suggests 
that source characteristics might also moderate the persuasion of implicit evaluations. Forehand 
and Perkins presented celebrity voice-over advertisements to participants. One week later, they 
measured participants’ implicit evaluations of those celebrities. Two weeks after that, they 
measured implicit evaluations of the advertised brands. They found that implicit evaluations of 
the celebrities predicted implicit evaluations of the products. Although this evidence is 
correlational, it lends support to the idea that source characteristics of persuasive messages (i.e., 
the liking of the person who endorses a brand) may impact implicit evaluations.  
In sum, earlier studies suggest that implicit evaluations can be changed via verbal 
information and hint that source characteristics may also be important. However, little is known 
about whether persuasive message influence implicit evaluations under the same conditions as 
explicit evaluations. In the present studies, we begin to tackle this question by experimentally 
manipulating the credibility of the source of the persuasive message while keeping constant the 
content of the message. The source was described in a way that implied either a high or a low 
level of expertise (Studies 1 and 2) or trustworthiness (Studies 3 and 4).  
In the four studies just described – and in all the previously reviewed work assessing the 
impact of persuasive messages on implicit evaluations – participants were allowed, or even 
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encouraged, to consciously consider the information with which they were presented. What is as 
yet unknown, then, is whether this opportunity is necessary for changing implicit evaluations. 
Leading theories of attitude change such as the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, Liberman, 
& Eagly, 1989) and the elaboration likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) note that explicit 
evaluations can be impacted by source information through both high-effort processes engaged 
in when participants have mental resources and are motivated to use them, and also through low-
effort processes when participants’ ability or motivation is restricted in some way. Therefore, to 
begin to understand how source expertise might impact implicit evaluations, we manipulated 
cognitive load to test whether the impact of source credibility would occur only when 
participants had the opportunity to consider the information about the source, or whether source 
information would impact implicit evaluations through multiple routes as is the case for explicit 
evaluations.  
Study 1 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 209 visitors to the Project Implicit research website. Mean age was 29.2 
years (SD=11.6). 70.3% of the participants were women. Participation was restricted to United 
States citizens (74.4% were White; 11.1% were African American, 1.9% were Asian; and 12.6% 
were Multiracial, Other, or Unknown). 
Materials 
Expertise Manipulation. All participants were asked to imagine that they were 
searching the Internet for information about laundry detergents and that the first information they 
found was on the homepage of an individual named Jonathan Brower (adapted from Tormala et 
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al., 2006). Participants in the ‘High’ expertise condition read that Jonathan Brower was 54 years 
old and then read the following information about him:  
“Jonathan is a Yale-educated chemist who works for his state's Department of 
Water Resources. In addition, he volunteers on a bi-partisan Consumer Protection 
Board for his local government. The board is a small group of successful business 
people, scientists, and politicians. They are asked to work together to promote 
community safety. This month, each board member has been asked to collect 
information on the quality and affordability of a variety of types of products that 
they have experience with.”  
In contrast, participants in the ‘Low’ expertise condition read that Jonathan Brower was 
14 years old and then read the following description of him:  
 “Jonathan spends one Saturday each month meeting with his middle school's 
Consumer Club. The club is a small group of students ranging from 4th to 8th 
grade, and is usually supervised by Jonathan's Physical Education teacher. 
Common activities include visiting local businesses and cutting out 
advertisements from magazines. This month, each of the kids has collected 
information about consumer products that they have heard of to share with their 
friends in the club.”  
Information about Soltate Detergents. Next, all participants read a passage titled “The 
Benefits of Soltate Detergents” designed to instill a preference for Soltate brand laundry 
detergents relative to other brands (Appendix A). The passage was adapted from a manipulation 
composed of strong arguments used in previous research (Tormala et al., 2006). Laundry 
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detergents made by Soltate were described as being less expensive, but safer and more powerful 
than other detergents.  
Implicit Association Test (IAT). Participants completed an IAT measuring the strength 
of their associations between ‘Soltate Detergents’ and ‘Other Detergents’ and ‘good’ and ‘bad’. 
Evaluative stimuli were five good words (e.g., wonderful) and five bad words (e.g., nasty). 
Stimuli for Soltate Detergents were the words ‘Soltate Detergents’ and three images of laundry 
detergent containers marked ‘Soltate’, while Other Detergents used the words ‘Other Detergents’ 
and three images of laundry detergent containers marked ‘Other Detergents’ (Appendix B). 
Stimuli from one of the four categories were presented one at a time on a computer screen. 
Participants categorized the stimuli quickly while making as few errors as possible. Category 
labels appeared in the upper-left and upper-right of the screen and participants used the “E” and 
“I” keys to categorize stimuli to the left and right, respectively.  
The IAT was constructed following the recommendations of Nosek and colleagues 
(Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2005; 2007). Participants began the IAT with 20 trials sorting 
Soltate stimuli to the left and stimuli related to ‘Other Detergents’ to the right (half of the 
participants completed the IAT in this way, while the other began by sorting Soltate stimuli to 
the right). They then completed 20 trials sorting positive stimuli to the left and negative stimuli 
to the right (the side of the screen which was positive and negative was held constant across 
participants). Next, participants completed 56 trials in which stimuli related to Soltate and 
positive shared a single response key and stimuli related to ‘Other Detergents’ and negative 
shared a single response key. Participants then practiced sorting stimuli related to Soltate and 
Other Detergents with the side of the screen reversed (i.e., participants who had previously been 
sorting Soltate stimuli to the left, now practiced sorting them to the right) for 40 trials. Finally, 
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participants completed a second set of 56 trials in which Soltate stimuli shared a response key 
with negative and ‘Other Detergents’ stimuli shared a response key with positive (or vice versa). 
If the participant made an error in categorizing, a red “X” appeared on the screen and the 
participant corrected their mistake in order to continue. Latencies were recorded until a correct 
response was made. 
 The IAT score was calculated using the D-algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 
2003). Trials with reaction times shorter than 400ms or longer than 10000ms were removed. The 
IAT was scored such that positive numbers indicate a preference for Soltate relative to Other 
Detergents. IAT scores from 12 participants (5.7%) were dropped because of error rates above 
30% across the entire task, or above 40% for any one of the four critical blocks.
1
 Split-half 
reliability – correlating IAT D score from the first half of the blocks with the second half of the 
blocks – for the remaining 197 IATs was r=.49. 
 Explicit Evaluations. Participants reported their explicit evaluation by responding to the 
question “Which of the following statements best describes you?” with a 7-point scale anchored 
by “I strongly prefer Soltate Detergents to Other Detergents” and “I strongly prefer Other 
Detergents to Soltate Detergents”. Responses were coded from -3 to +3 with positive scores 
indicating a relative preference for Soltate.  
 Perceptions of Source. Participants reported on their perceptions of the source’s 
expertise, intelligence, likeability, and trustworthiness in that order. Each item was presented 
using the question “How ‘x’ do you think this person is?” with the words ‘expert’, ‘intelligent’, 
‘likeable’, and ‘trustworthy’ inserted at the location of ‘x’. They used 6-point scales ranging 
from 1=Not at all ‘x’ to 6=Extremely ‘x’.  
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 Procedure 
 Upon being randomly assigned to complete this study from a pool of potential studies, 
participants imagined they were searching the Internet for information about laundry detergents. 
They were told to pay close attention to the information about the detergent and about who 
presented the information since they would be asked questions about both throughout the study. 
Participants were then randomly assigned to read about Jonathan Brower as either High in 
expertise (i.e., Yale-educated chemist) or Low in expertise (i.e., 14-year old member of a 
Consumer Club). Next, participants read information about a laundry detergent named Soltate 
that had been gathered by Jonathan Brower. After that, participants completed the IAT and then 
explicit measures. Finally, they reported on their perceptions of the source’s expertise, 
intelligence, likeability, and trustworthiness, in that order. Once having been assigned to this 
study, participants were never assigned to the study again on subsequent visits to the website. 
Results and Discussion 
Overall, participants’ implicit evaluations revealed a preference for ‘Soltate Detergents’ 
relative to ‘Other Detergents’ both implicitly (M=0.48, SD=0.39, t[196]=17.27, p<.0001, d=1.23) 
and explicitly (M=0.80, SD=1.36, t[196]=8.27, p<.0001, d=0.59). This makes sense because the 
information given about Soltate was always positive; higher scores are thus indicative of more 
persuasion. Participants’ explicit preferences were positively correlated with implicit 
evaluations, r(195)=.32, p<.0001. To test whether our manipulation affected the perceived 
credibility of the source, we combined responses to the source’s expertise, trustworthiness, and 
intelligence (α=.76); participants viewed the source of the message as being more credible in the 
‘High Expertise’ condition (M=3.98, SD=1.05) than the ‘Low Expertise’ condition (M=2.85, 
SD=0.83), t(195)=8.44, p<.0001, d=1.19.
2
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Supporting the central hypothesis of the study, source expertise significantly affected 
implicit preferences; participants showed a stronger implicit preference for Soltate when that 
information was presented by an individual ‘High’ in expertise (M=0.54, SD=0.36) than ‘Low’ 
in expertise (M=0.42, SD=0.41), t(195)=2.24, p=.026, d=0.32. In addition, we replicated 
previous research on explicit evaluations, as participants reported a greater preference for Soltate 
when that information was presented by an individual ‘High’ in expertise (M=1.01, SD=1.40) 
than ‘Low’ in expertise (M=0.60, SD=1.29), t(195)=2.13, p=.034, d=0.30. In sum, identical 
information is more impactful on implicit evaluations when that information is presented by a 
source that is deemed to be relatively higher in expertise. In Study 2, we sought to replicate this 
finding with the personalized IAT (Olson & Fazio, 2004). 
Study 2 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 208 visitors to the Project Implicit research website. Mean age was 32.7 
years (SD=12.2) and 74% of the participants were women. Participants were restricted to United 
States citizens (69.9% were White; 15.5% were African American, 1.0% were Asian; and 13.6% 
were Multiracial, Other, or Unknown). 
Materials and Procedure 
 All materials and procedures were exactly as in Study 1 with the exception of replacing 
the standard version of the IAT with a personalized version. In addition, the item regarding 
likeability of the source was not included. 
 Personalized IAT. The personalized IAT was identical in measurement and scoring 
procedures to the IAT used in Study 1 except that the category labels of “good” and “bad” were 
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changed to “I like” and “I dislike” (see Han, Olson, & Fazio, 2006, Experiment 2). Twelve 
participants (5.8% of total data) were dropped for too rapid rate of responding or too high error 
rates; split-half reliability of the measure for the remaining 196 participants was r=.44. 
Results and Discussion 
Overall, participants’ implicit evaluations revealed a preference for ‘Soltate Detergents’ 
relative to ‘Other Detergents’ both implicitly (M=0.54, SD=0.38, t[195]=19.91, p<.0001, d=1.42) 
and explicitly (M=0.90, SD=1.37, t[206]=9.49, p<.0001, d=0.66). Participants’ explicit 
preferences were correlated with implicit evaluations at r(194)=.30, p<.0001. The manipulation 
of source credibility was again successful, with participants reporting more credibility (combined 
ratings of trust, expertise, and intelligence; α=.85) on the part of the source when in the ‘High 
Expertise’ condition (M=3.39, SD=1.09) than the ‘Low Expertise’ condition (M=2.22, SD=0.91), 
t(206)=8.43, p<.0001, d=1.17.  
As in Study 1, manipulating the level of source expertise significantly affected implicit 
evaluations, this time assessed by means of a personalized version of the IAT. Participants 
indicated a stronger implicit preference for Soltate when that information was presented by an 
individual ‘High’ in expertise (M=0.60, SD=0.33) than ‘Low’ in expertise (M=0.48, SD=0.40), 
t(194)=2.18, p=.031, d=0.31. Also as in Study 1, participants self-reported a greater preference 
for Soltate when that information was presented by an individual ‘High’ in expertise (M=1.20, 
SD=1.36) than ‘Low’ in expertise (M=0.65, SD=1.33), t(205)=2.94, p=.004, d=0.41. 
In line with the literature on the persuasion of explicit evaluations, our first two studies 
clearly indicate that an identical persuasive message is more impactful on implicit evaluations 
when the source possesses a high level of expertise. In the third study, we investigated whether 
this is also true for an alternative operationalization of source credibility – trustworthiness. 
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Study 3 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 300 visitors to the Project Implicit research website. Mean age was 25.9 
years (SD=9.95) and 73% of the participants were women. Participants were restricted to United 
States citizens (78.3% were White; 5% were African American, 3.7% were Asian; and 13% were 
Multiracial, Other, or Unknown). 
Materials 
 Information about Soltate Detergents. Participants read the same passage consisting of 
positive information about Soltate Detergents as in Study 1. 
 Trustworthiness Manipulation. Participants imagined that they were searching the 
Internet for information about a consumer product. Before reading the information about Soltate 
Detergents, they imagined that they found the information on a website. In the ‘High’ 
trustworthiness condition, participants were told that the website was the homepage of a local 
Consumer Protection Board; in the ‘Low’ trustworthiness condition, participants were told that 
the website was the homepage of the company that made the laundry detergent in question (as in 
Briñol et al., 2004; Appendix C). They were further told that the company had recently changed 
their brand name in an effort to distance themselves from a past product recall and had hired a 
public relations firm in an attempt to increase their brand’s popularity. 
 IAT. Participants completed the same IAT as in Study 1. Positive scores indicate a 
preference for Soltate Detergents relative to Other Detergents. IAT scores from 18 participants 
(6%) were dropped for error rates above 30% overall or above 40% for any one block. Split-half 
correlation of the remaining 282 IATs was r=.44. 
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Other measures. Explicit evaluations and perceptions of the source were assessed 
exactly as in Study 2.  
Procedure 
  The procedure for Study 3 was the same as in the previous studies except that the 
information was attributed to a source that was either high in trustworthiness (website of a 
consumer protection board) or low in trustworthiness (website of company that manufactures the 
consumer product), and the first item of the manipulation check asked about source 
trustworthiness rather than expertise.  
Results and Discussion 
As in the prior studies, participants’ revealed an implicit preference for ‘Soltate 
Detergents’ relative to ‘Other Detergents’ both implicitly (M=0.47, SD=0.37, t[281]=21.17, 
p<.0001, d=1.27) and explicitly (M=0.46, SD=1.50, t[281]=5.18, p<.0001, d=0.31); explicit 
preferences were correlated with implicit evaluations at r(280)=.20, p=.0008. Additionally, our 
manipulation of source credibility (α=.72) was successful; participants rated the source as 
significantly more credible in the ‘High Trust’ condition (M=3.23, SD=1.07) than in the ‘Low 
Trust’ condition (M=2.58, SD=0.90), t(280)=5.58, p<.0001, d=0.67.  
Implicit preferences were significantly affected by manipulating the level of source 
trustworthiness; participants indicated a stronger implicit preference for Soltate when that 
information was presented by an individual ‘High’ in trustworthiness (M=0.52, SD=0.34) than 
‘Low’ in trustworthiness (M=0.42, SD=0.39), t(280)=2.40, p=.017, d=0.29. We again replicated 
previous research on explicit evaluations in showing that participants self-reported a greater 
preference for Soltate Detergents when that information was presented by an individual ‘High’ in 
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trustworthiness (M=1.09, SD=1.33) than ‘Low’ in trustworthiness (M=-0.14, SD=1.42), 
t(280)=7.53, p<.0001, d=0.90. While both implicit and explicit evaluations were sensitive to the 
source trustworthiness, there is a notable distinction between the two types of evaluations. In the 
‘Low’ trustworthiness condition, participants’ explicit evaluations evidenced no preference for 
Soltate despite the positive information, presumably because the source appeared particularly 
untrustworthy. While implicit liking of Soltate was likewise weaker in the ‘Low’ trustworthiness 
condition, there was still a strong preference for Soltate compared to the alternatives. This 
suggests that implicit evaluations may be sensitive to source trustworthiness, but not necessarily 
to the same degree as are explicit evaluations. In sum, as with manipulations of source expertise, 
identical information is more impactful on implicit evaluations when that information is 
presented by a source that is deemed to be relatively higher in trustworthiness.  
To demonstrate that these effects are not restricted to one implicit measure, in Study 4 we 
attempted to replicate the effect with the Affect Misattribution Procedure (AMP; Payne, Cheng, 
Govorun, & Stewart, 2005). The addition of the AMP is especially important as it examines the 
impact of primes on the degree of liking of target stimuli rather than using response latency as an 
indicator of association strength as with the versions of the IAT that were used in the previous 
three studies. In addition, we included an IAT for a direct replication of Study 3. 
Study 4 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 458 visitors to the Project Implicit research website. Mean age was 27.5 
years (SD=11.5) and 64.3% of the participants were women. Participants were restricted to 
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United States citizens (71.1% were White; 10.8% were African American, 2.9% were Asian; and 
15.2% were Multiracial, Other, or Unknown). 
Materials and Procedure 
 All materials and procedures were exactly as in Study 3 with the exception of the 
addition of an AMP. Whether participants completed the AMP or the IAT first was 
counterbalanced across participants. 
 AMP. In the AMP, participants see a series of stimuli each of which is followed by a 
Chinese pictograph. Participants ignore the initial “prime” stimulus and rate the pictograph as 
being more or less pleasant than the average pictograph. The primes were the three images of 
Soltate, the three images of Other Detergents, and a grey rectangle (neutral stimulus). 
Participants saw 24 of each of the three types of primes, for a total of 72 trials. An individual 
trial began with the presentation of the prime which was on the screen for 100ms. This was 
followed by a blank screen of 100ms after which one of the 72 Chinese pictographs was 
presented for 100ms. Finally, a mask image was presented (a black and white image) until the 
participant made a response. The 72 trials were split into two blocks of 36 to give participants a 
chance to rest if they desired. AMP data from 26 participants (5.7%) was deleted because they 
responded with either “Pleasant” or “Unpleasant” to all of the trials in the task. Individual AMP 
scores were calculated by subtracting the proportion of “pleasant” responses following an “Other 
Detergent” prime from the proportion of “pleasant” responses following a “Soltate” prime. 
Positive AMP score, therefore, indicate a preference for Soltate. A correlation between the first 
and second block of 36 trials indicated a reliability of r=.57.  
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IAT. Participants completed the same IAT as in Study 3. Scores from 37 participants 
were dropped (8.1%) due to high error rates. Reliability among the remaining 421 participants 
was r=.55. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants’ revealed an implicit preference for ‘Soltate Detergents’ relative to ‘Other 
Detergents’ when measured by the IAT (M=0.47, SD=0.40, t[420]=24.26, p<.0001, d=1.18) and 
explicitly (M=0.25, SD=1.57, t[425]=3.28, p=.001, d=0.16). Explicit preferences were correlated 
with both the IAT r(393)=.32, p<.0001 and the AMP r(411)=.33, p<.0001; the IAT and AMP 
correlated at r(394)=.29, p<.0001. The manipulation was again successful, with participants 
reporting more credibility (α=.72) on the part of the source when in the ‘High Trustworthy’ 
condition (M=3.04, SD=1.04) than the ‘Low Trustworthy’ condition (M=2.39, SD=0.92), 
t(433)=6.89, p<.0001, d=0.66. Replicating Study 3, manipulating the level of source 
trustworthiness significantly affected implicit preferences as measured by the IAT. Participants 
implicitly preferred Soltate more when presented by an individual ‘High’ in trustworthiness 
(M=0.51, SD=0.35) than ‘Low’ in trustworthiness (M=0.43, SD=0.43), t(419)=2.17, p=.031, 
d=0.21.  
Data for the AMP were analyzed using a 3 (prime: Soltate vs. neutral vs. Other 
Detergent) x 2 (condition: High Trust vs. Low Trust) ANOVA with prime as a within- 
participants factor and condition a between-participants factor. There was a main effect of prime 
valence, F(2, 429)=42.34, p<.001. Participants responded that a pictograph was “pleasant” more 
often following a Soltate prime (M=.60, SD=.24) than an Other Detergent prime (M=.53, 
SD=.24), t(431)=4.61, p<.0001, d=0.22. The effect of prime valence was moderated by the 
trustworthiness of the source, F(2, 429)=5.76, p=.003. In particular, the proportion of positive 
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responses following Soltate primes was higher when the source was high in trust (M=.64, 
SD=.23) than low in trust (M=.56, SD=.25), t(430)=3.69, p=.0003, d=0.36.
3 
Participants self-reported a greater preference for Soltate when presented by an individual 
‘High’ in trustworthiness (M=0.70, SD=1.41) than ‘Low’ in trustworthiness (M=-0.19, SD=1.59), 
t(424)=6.11, p<.0001, d=0.59. 
Thus, Study 4 directly replicates the effect observed in Study 3, conceptually replicates 
effects observed in Study 1 and Study 2, and shows that the effect of trustworthiness is replicable 
with another implicit measure.
4
  
Study 5 
In all four studies, participants were encouraged to pay close attention to the information 
about both the message and the message’s source. As such, the opportunity for elaboration was 
high and constant across the four studies. As noted previously, leading theories of attitude 
change such as the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken, et al., 1989) and the elaboration 
likelihood model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) have noted that the effects of source credibility can 
occur through multiple routes. Specifically, under conditions of effortful processing – as in the 
first four studies – source effects assert their influence by biasing the thoughts which appear in 
mind in response to a persuasive message (e.g., Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994). However, 
source characteristics can also affect explicit evaluations under conditions of less effortful 
processing (see Petty & Wegener, 1998 for a review) through their operation as simple heuristic 
cues (e.g., “whatever experts say must be good”). Thus, in an attempt to understand the 
mechanism by which information about a message’s source affects implicit evaluations, we ran a 
final study investigating whether implicit evaluations would also be affected by source 
credibility even when participants’ ability to elaborate was low. If implicit evaluations change 
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based on source characteristics in low elaboration conditions, that could be taken as evidence 
that a message’s source may exert its effects by acting as a simple, heuristic cue. However, if 
they are not affected when elaboration is relatively restricted, that would suggest that the 
opportunity to generate thoughts is necessary for changing implicit evaluations via source 
information. To the extent that implicit evaluations exert their influence automatically and 
outside of conscious awareness, the heuristic information contained in the attributes of a 
message’s source may be especially impactful on implicit evaluations. However, this has never 
been tested as all prior research has allowed participants the ability to consciously elaborate upon 
that information. As such, this study constitutes the first test of whether allowing mental 
elaboration is a necessary element in changing implicit evaluations during a persuasive attempt. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 594 visitors to the Project Implicit research website. Mean age was 31.1 
years (SD=12.5) and 70.6% of the participants were women. Participants were restricted to 
United States citizens (73.0% were White; 8.8% were African American, 3.9% were Asian; and 
14.3% were Multiracial, Other, or Unknown). 
Materials and Procedure 
 Cognitive load. In line with previous manipulations of cognitive load (e.g., Gilbert & 
Hixon, 1991), participants kept a number in mind for the length of the study. In the ‘Low load’ 
condition, the number was ‘28’. In the ‘High load’ condition, the number was ‘1425893’.  
Information about the Source. The information about the message’s source was 
identical to that used in Studies 2 through 4. 
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 Information about Soltate Detergents. The persuasive message about Soltate 
Detergents was modified slightly from the previous studies to reflect research indicating that 
source effects may be more likely to occur when the information is not uniformly strong or weak 
(see Tormala et al, 2007). Thus, while the message was still clearly pro-Soltate, the positivity of 
the language was reduced (Appendix B). 
 IAT. Participants completed the same IAT from Studies 3 and 4. Scores from 28 
participants were dropped (4.7%) due to high error rates. Reliability of the measure among the 
remaining 566 participants was r=.53. 
Procedure 
 The procedure was nearly identical to the previous studies, including only a couple of 
alterations. Following the welcome page participants were instructed to remember a number. 
Participants in the ‘Low load’ condition were assigned a two-digit number, while participants in 
the ‘High load’ condition were assigned seven-digit number. After reading the instructions and 
information about the source and Soltate, participants completed the Soltate – Other Detergents 
IAT, a measure of explicit evaluations, and manipulation checks in that order. Finally, 
participants reported if they had written down the number rather than attempting to remember it. 
Data from the 13 participants (2.2%) who admitted writing it down were dropped before running 
any analyses. 
Results and Discussion 
Participants’ revealed an implicit preference for ‘Soltate Detergents’ relative to ‘Other 
Detergents’ implicitly (M=0.58, SD=0.38, t[552]=36.34, p<.0001, d=1.53) and explicitly 
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(M=0.37, SD=1.34, t[579]=6.65, p<.0001, d=0.28). Explicit preferences were correlated with the 
IAT at r(551)=.24, p<.0001. 
Both implicit and explicit evaluation scores were analyzed using a 2 (credibility level: 
High vs. Low) x 2 (cognitive load: High vs. Low) ANOVA with both factors manipulated 
between participants. Regarding explicit evaluations, the main effect of cognitive load was not 
significant, F(1, 576)=0.01, p=.91, indicating that people did not form stronger explicit 
preferences under low than under high load. There was, however, a main effect of credibility, 
F(1, 576)=39.22, p<.0001, such that participants explicitly preferred Soltate more when 
presented by a source high in credibility (M=0.74, SD=1.22) than low in credibility (M=0.06, 
SD=1.35), d=0.52. Further, this effect of source credibility was not moderated by the 
manipulation of cognitive load, F(1, 576)=1.72, p=.19, indicating that source credibility can 
impact explicit evaluations even when the opportunity to elaborate is low.  
 The results differ in important ways for implicit evaluations. As with explicit evaluations, 
a main effect of cognitive load was not observed, F(1, 549)=1.22, p=.27. There was a main effect 
of credibility, F(1, 549)=4.43, p=.036, such that participants implicitly preferred Soltate more 
when presented by a source high in credibility (M=0.62, SD=0.36) than low in credibility 
(M=0.55, SD=0.39). Of primary importance, this effect of source credibility on implicit 
evaluations was moderated by cognitive load, F(1, 549)=7.57, p=.006. In particular, when 
cognitive load was low (and, therefore, elaboration likelihood was high, as in previous studies) 
participants implicitly preferred Soltate more when it was presented by a source high in 
credibility (M=0.68, SD=0.34) as compared to low in credibility (M=0.52, SD=0.39), 
t(299)=3.65, p=.0003, d=0.42. However, for participants in the high load condition – who, 
presumably could not elaborate on the information presented about Soltate – there was no 
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difference in their preference for Soltate based on whether the source was high in credibility 
(M=0.55, SD=0.37) or low in credibility (M=0.57, SD=0.39), t(250)=0.43, p=.67, d=-0.05.  
Study 5 reinforces the finding that both implicit and explicit evaluations are sensitive to 
source credibility, but adds an intriguing wrinkle. In particular, while explicit evaluations were 
affected both when participants were under high and low cognitive load, implicit evaluations 
were only affected by source information when participants were under low cognitive load and 
not when they were under high cognitive load.  
Mediational Analyses 
In an additional attempt to triangulate on how the effects of source credibility influence 
implicit evaluations, we conducted Sobel tests to assess whether the self-reported ratings of 
credibility (average ratings of expertise, trustworthiness, and intelligence) mediated the effects 
on implicit (and explicit) evaluations. In the first four studies, persuasion of explicit evaluations 
was mediated by perceptions of source credibility (all Zs>3.74, all ps<.0002). In Study 5, we 
observed this mediation both when cognitive load was low, Z=4.35, p=.00001 and when it was 
high Z=3.25, p=.001. As such, it is clear that explicit evaluations of Soltate were impacted by 
self-reported perceptions of the source’s credibility. With regard to implicit evaluations, the 
results are less clear. In Studies 2, 3 and 4, self-reported perceptions of source credibility did 
serve to mediate the persuasion of implicit evaluations, as measured by the AMP, IAT, and 
personalized IAT (all Zs>2.10, all ps<.036). However, perceptions of source credibility did not 
mediate the impact of persuasive messages on implicit evaluations – as measured by the IAT - in 
Study 1 (Z=1.16, p=.25) or in Study 5, regardless of whether cognitive load was high, Z=1.49, 
p=.14 or low, Z=0.32, p=.75. These mixed results with regard to mediation suggest that other 
factors, such as thought favorability, may be making contributions and thus signal the need for 
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further research – preferably designed with the primary aim of testing for mediation – before 
firm conclusions are drawn about whether perceptions of source credibility mediate the impact of 
source credibility on implicit evaluations. 
General Discussion 
 In five studies, manipulations of source credibility that are known to moderate the impact 
of persuasive messages on explicit evaluations also proved to moderate the effect of persuasive 
messages on implicit evaluations, as measured by the IAT (Studies 1, 3, 4, and 5), a personalized 
IAT (Study 2), and an AMP (Study 4). Implicit evaluations were more strongly affected by a 
source high in credibility as operationalized through expertise (Studies 1 and 2), and 
trustworthiness (Studies 3, 4, and 5). In Study 5, we observed that source information only 
moderates the persuasion of implicit evaluations when participants have the ability to elaborate 
on the information (as in the previous four studies). In contrast, source information had no 
impact on implicit evaluations when participants experienced a high cognitive load and were 
therefore unable to generate thoughts in response to the persuasive attempt. Our findings have 
important implication for the understanding of both persuasion and implicit evaluation.    
One reason why effects of source credibility on implicit evaluations have not yet been 
investigated may be the dominance of dual process models of implicit and explicit evaluations 
within attitude research. Whereas implicit evaluations are typically thought to reflect associations 
in memory that have been gradually formed over long periods of time, explicit evaluations are 
attributed to propositions that can be formed and altered quickly on the basis of information 
available in memory and in the present situation; some theories even assert that the two types of 
evaluations are based on different processes or representations (e.g., Rydell & McConnell, 2006; 
Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). This view has been quite influential and, as noted 
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previously, appears to have become reified through studies showing that explicit evaluations can 
be changed through verbal instructions (see Bohner & Dickel, 2010; Crano & Prislin, 2006 for 
recent reviews), while implicit evaluations are changed either by overtraining existing 
associations (e.g., Baccus et al., 2004; Dijksterhuis, 2004; Hermans et al., 2003; Kawakami et al., 
2007; Weirs et al., 2011) or through manipulating the measurement context (e.g., Blair et al., 
2001; Dasgupta & Greenwald, 2001; Mitchell et al., 2003; Wittenbrink et al., 2001). Importantly, 
the current work suggests that there may be many more pathways to changing implicit 
evaluations, and that the long history of persuasion with regard to explicit evaluations may 
provide a useful road map.  
The fact that source credibility can influence implicit evaluations is anticipated by some 
current theories. For instance, Gawronski and Bodenhausen’s Associative-Propositional 
Evaluative (APE) model (2006, 2011) allows for the possibility that propositionally-based 
persuasive messages influence both the associations that are activated in memory and the 
structure of the associations themselves (also see Fazio, 1990; Fazio & Towles-Schwen, 1999). 
Because implicit evaluations are assumed to reflect the associations that are activated in memory 
at a given point in time, persuasion of implicit evaluations via the type of propositional 
information presented in the current work is compatible with the APE model. In particular, 
positive associations could form based upon the learned proposition that “Soltate is good”. 
Moreover, the strength of this association could depend on how confident one is that the 
proposition is true, which in turn depends on the credibility of the source (see Brinol, et al, 2004; 
Tormala et al, 2006 for relationship between source credibility and thought confidence in 
changing explicit evaluations). 
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However, if propositions act directly upon the structure of a theorized associative system, 
or one may argue that a more parsimonious account could do away with a separate associative 
system entirely (see Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009, p. 231). For example, our results 
are in line with the recent proposal that implicit evaluations reflect the automatic activation of 
propositions (Hughes, Barnes-Holmes, & De Houwer, 2011). With regard to the present studies, 
one could argue that the persuasive message leads to the proposition that the Soltate product is 
good. Confidence in this propositional belief may be greater when the source of information is 
credible. Once the proposition about Soltate has been formed, it can be stored in episodic 
memory from which it can be activated automatically and thus result in a positive implicit 
evaluation. The main difference between this propositional account and the APE model account 
(i.e., that propositions can influence the structure and/or activation of associations) is that 
episodic memories of propositions conserve information about the nature of the relation between 
stimuli (e.g., “Soltate causes benefits” rather than “Soltate prevents benefits”) whereas 
associations are merely a result of the co-occurrence of two stimuli (see De Houwer, 2009; 
Lagnado, Waldmann, Hagmayer, & Sloman, 2007). It is important to note that the current work 
was not designed to adjudicate competing theories of (changes in) implicit evaluations. Instead, 
our main focus was to demonstrate that persuasive messages can have an impact on implicit 
evaluation in a way that depends on source credibility.  
It is also important to point out that the two operationalizations of credibility had 
differently-sized impacts on explicit and implicit evaluations. Whereas the impact of expertise 
showed similar effect sizes for implicit and explicit evaluations, effects for trustworthiness were 
bigger for explicit evaluations than for implicit evaluations. This could mean that, despite the 
common influence of credibility, there are important differences between implicit and explicit 
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evaluations that are subject to differential influence depending on the information or persuasive 
appeal.  
The most important discrepancy between the results for explicit and implicit evaluations 
appeared in the final study in which source information affected implicit evaluations only when 
participants were not cognitively busy. When cognitive load was induced, source credibility still 
affected explicit evaluations, but not implicit evaluations. This implies that information about a 
message’s source does not act as a simple, heuristic cue for shaping implicit evaluations. If it did, 
then the cognitive load manipulation should not have been effective at blocking the impact of the 
message’s source. However, explicit evaluations were still affected, suggesting that the heuristic 
cue of credibility is sufficient to alter them. Together, this suggests that source information exerts 
its effects on implicit evaluations by biasing the thoughts that come to mind and are elaborated 
during the persuasive attempt. By using a cognitive load to reduce the likelihood of having and 
elaborating on those thoughts, a message’s source no longer affects implicit evaluations.  
Ironically, perhaps, source credibility might only influence implicit evaluations when the 
opportunity exists to explicitly process the source information. The elaborative effort might be 
necessary for the formation or “retraining” of associations as the result of persuasive 
propositional information (Shiffrin & Schneider, 1977). Therefore, the notion that “implicit 
cues” (heuristic information) are more likely to affect implicit evaluations, whereas “explicit 
cues” (elaborative processing) are more likely to affect explicit evaluations – while intuitively 
satisfying – may be wrong. The key insight is that as a predictor, implicit evaluations may 
influence behavior through subtle, heuristic means, but as an outcome, implicit evaluations may 
also be shaped more by overt, elaborative efforts to create, change, or override existing 
associations (see also Teachman, Marker, & Smith-Janik, 2008). 
Source credibility        27 
 
Importantly, the lack of difference between credibility conditions under high cognitive 
load cannot be attributed to a reduction in the quality of implicit measurement in those 
conditions. Indeed, a very strong preference for Soltate (in line with the persuasive message) was 
instantiated under high load, t(251)=23.78, p<.0001, d=1.50; split-half reliability did not differ 
by load (high: r=.52, low: r=.56; z=0.71, p=.48); and the IAT correlated similarly with explicit 
evaluations in the two load condition (high: r=.24, low: r=.23; z=0.05, p=.96). The IAT, 
therefore, performed equally well when participants were under cognitive load, it simply was not 
affected by the source.  
More speculatively, the current results may shed some light on the longevity of attitude 
change. Specifically, although source characteristics have been shown to operate both at more 
and less thoughtful levels, the resultant evaluations are stronger (i.e., longer lasting, more 
resistant, more predictive of behavior) when people engage in more elaboration during the 
persuasion attempt (Petty, Haugtvedt, & Smith, 1995). In the current work, we only observed 
changes in implicit evaluations based on source characteristics in the high elaboration conditions. 
Thus it may be that explicit evaluations that are changed through methods that are low in 
elaboration are not long-lasting because of the lack of concurrent changes in implicit evaluations.  
In summary, manipulations of source credibility previously shown to be effective at 
changing explicit evaluations were also effective at changing implicit evaluations. Identical, 
positive information about a novel consumer product was more influential on implicit 
evaluations when that information was presented by a source high rather than low in credibility.  
The fact that these source-level variables traditionally used to change explicit evaluations also 
moderated implicit evaluations opens interesting avenues of investigation for both persuasion 
researchers – who have relied almost entirely on explicit evaluations – and researchers of 
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implicit evaluations – who have relied on overtraining and context effects when attempting to 
change implicit evaluations. However, while the direction of the effects was consistently the 
same for explicit and implicit evaluations, it was not the case that implicit and explicit 
evaluations changed in exactly the same way. Instead, while explicit evaluations changed both 
under conditions of low and high elaboration, implicit evaluations only changed under high 
elaboration conditions. This has important implications for our understanding of how implicit 
evaluations are changed, because it suggests that implicit evaluations may be most effectively 
changed through manipulations relatively high in effort and thinking and that the quality of the 
thoughts arising during a persuasive attempt are integral – or even necessary – for changing 
implicit evaluations.  
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Notes 
1
 These error rates were used as cut-offs in each of the subsequent studies. Other data (i.e., self-
report measures or second implicit measure) for participants with deleted IAT scores were 
retained. The degrees of freedom in this and subsequent studies vary slightly across tests because 
of slight variation in missing data. 
 
2 
Participants did not rate the source as being more likeable when they were in the ‘High 
Expertise’ condition (M=3.62, SD=1.09) compared to the ‘Low Expertise’ condition (M=3.68, 
SD=1.11), t(194)=-0.52, p=.60, d=0.05. 
 
3 
An alternate method of testing for the effect of our manipulation on AMP scores is to compare 
the means on the difference score (constructed by subtracting the proportion of positive 
responses following an “Other Detergent” prime from the proportion of positive responses 
following a “Soltate” prime). With this method, participants preferred Soltate more when they 
were in the ‘High Trustworthy’ condition (M=.12, SD=.28) as compared to the ‘Low 
Trustworthy condition (M=0.02, SD=.33), t(430)=3.39, p=.0008, d=0.33. 
 
4
 We also conducted a study using an evaluative priming task (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & 
Kardes, 1986). In this study, 407 participants self-reported a greater preference for Soltate when 
presented by an individual ‘High’ in trustworthiness (M=0.60, SD=1.29) than ‘Low’ in 
trustworthiness (M=-0.21, SD=1.42), t(402)=6.06, p<.0001, d=0.60. However, implicit 
preferences – as measured by the evaluative priming task – were not significantly impacted. The 
evaluative priming task was scored by dropping error trials and then log transforming the means 
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of the remaining latencies. Difference scores were then created by subtracting negative scores 
from positive scores separately for both Soltate trials and “Other Detergents”. Finally, difference 
scores were constructed by subtracting positivity toward “Other Detergents” from positivity 
toward Soltate. Participants did not reveal more of an implicit preference for Soltate when 
presented by an individual ‘High’ in trustworthiness (M=-0.004, SD=0.07) than ‘Low’ in 
trustworthiness (M=-0.005, SD=0.07), t(381)=0.19, p=.85, d=0.02. However, there are reasons to 
believe that the evaluative priming task that we constructed may not have been optimal. Most 
importantly, the targets were complex images (images of laundry detergents) with the words 
“Soltate” or “Other Detergents” on them. Previous research has indicated that the meaning of 
word qualifiers (e.g., “a friend” vs. “no friend”) is not impactful on an evaluative priming task, 
though it does impact performance on an AMP (Deutsch, Kordts-Freudinger, Gawronski, & 
Strack, 2009, Experiment 1). Thus, it is possible that both sets of stimuli primed the concept of 
“detergent” rather than being meaningfully distinct. Additionally, the targets were of different 
colors than the primes which may have helped participants to ignore the primes and thereby 
avoid priming effects (see Musch & Klauer, 2001). As such, further research is needed before 
any conclusions are drawn about the impact of a source’s credibility on an evaluative priming 
task. 
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Appendix A 
Stimuli for implicit measures 
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Appendix B 
Studies 1-4: Information about Soltate Brand Laundry Detergents 
The Benefits of SOLTATE Brand Laundry Detergents  
The laundry detergents made by SOLTATE are some of the best detergents available today. To 
begin with, SOLTATE detergents are less expensive than most other detergents. This is because 
they are both cheaper to make and packaged more efficiently. SOLTATE detergents are also 
more powerful than other detergents. They clean clothes better and leave them smelling fresher 
compared to other detergents. As a result, SOLTATE detergents may allow clothes to be cleaned 
less often, which reduces detergent costs and can make clothing last longer. Perhaps because 
SOLTATE detergents are cheaper and more effective, over the past few years they have topped 
the charts in customer satisfaction in the regions where they are sold. In addition, SOLTATE 
detergents are among the cleanest and safest type of detergent on the market. In summary, we 
would strongly recommend using detergents made by SOLTATE for household laundry. 
 
Study 5: Information about Soltate Brand Laundry Detergents 
 
The Benefits of SOLTATE Brand Laundry Detergents 
 
The laundry detergents made by SOLTATE seem to be very good laundry detergents.  
To begin with, SOLTATE detergents are less expensive than many other detergents.  
This may be because they are cheap to make and packaged efficiently. SOLTATE detergents are 
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also at least as powerful as most other detergents. They clean clothes well and leave them 
smelling fresh. As a result, SOLTATE detergents may allow clothes to be cleaned less often, 
which reduces detergent costs and can make clothing last longer. Perhaps because SOLTATE 
detergents are both cheap and effective, over the past few years they have sold very well in most 
of the regions where they are available. In addition, SOLTATE detergents are among the 
cleanest and safest types of detergent on the market. In summary, we would recommend using 
detergents made by SOLTATE for household laundry. 
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Appendix C 
 
Studies 3, 4, and 5: Manipulation of Source Trustworthiness 
 
High source trustworthiness: 
 
Imagine that you are trying to decide what laundry detergent to buy and you are searching on the 
internet for some information. 
The first thing you find is on the website for a Consumer Protection Board. The West River 
Consumer Protection Board was formed in response to public outcry about false advertising in 
the late 1950s.  
 
Since then, the board has been tasked with promoting the safety of the community's consumers. 
It has always been a small bi-partisan group of business people, scientists, and politicians. Each 
member is nominated by their community for being someone who is particularly fair-minded.  
 
For the past year, the board members have been collecting information on the quality and 
affordability of a variety of consumer products and presenting that information at monthly board 
meetings. The community has been very happy with the accuracy of the board's 
recommendations.  
 
Please read the following product information with that in mind.  
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Low source trustworthiness: 
 
Imagine that you are trying to decide what laundry detergent to buy and you are searching on the 
internet for some information.  
The first thing you find is on the website of a large laundry-detergent company. According to a 
legal disclaimer on the front page of their website, the company recently changed their brand 
name to distance themselves from a high-profile product recall they had several years ago.  
 
The company has hired a famous public relations firm that specializes in fixing the reputations of 
celebrities. In addition to recommending the brand name change, the public relations firm 
recommended that the company immediately launch a new website.  
 
The website promotes their brand of laundry detergent using positive language to make 
consumers think that they have a great product. The company has been very happy with their 
website's ability to make consumers forget the past problems with their laundry detergent.  
 
Please read the following product information with that in mind.  
 
